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WHERE IS THE CIO GOING? 
By GEORGE MORRIS 
What happened to the c.I.O.? The question is heard on all sides. 
For some time it has been evident that the c.I.O. was being led 
away from the fighting, drive-ahead spirit that won it great sup-
port in earlier days. The sweeping organizing drives and pace-
setting economic gains that made it so attractive to the workers 
in the past are now giving way to internal strife, inter-union raid-
ing, Red-baiting, witch-hunting, stagnation and decline. 
The c.I.O.'s leaders were once the targets of union-haters. They 
were Red-baited. Today the union-haters sing hosannas to most of 
these very leaders beCause they themselves picked up Red-baiting 
and witch-hunting as weapons against progressives in the unions. 
The recent C.1.O. convention in Portland brought the long de-
veloping situation to a head. Differences carne out into the open and 
were fought out between the dominant Right and progressive Left. 
For the first time a c.I.O. convention faced two sets of resolutions. 
What's behind this · division in the C.1.O.? Who is responsible 
for it? How can the c.I.O. be brought back to the forward-looking 
path it followed in its earlier days? For an adequate answer to 
those questions we should first retrace the c.I.O.'s development both 
to the time of its birth-days when it was united and progressive 
-and further back, to the historic conditions that led to its rise. 
The c.I.O.'s birth in 1935 was the high point of a struggle for 
a progressive trade union program that had been going on for 
generations. The roots of labor progressivism, commonly referred 
to as the Left wing, run back to the movements led by labor's 
trail-blazers in the last century. They encountered the same type 
of persecution, abuse and Red-baiting that all fighters face today. 
William Sylvis, the moulder who formed the first national labor 
federation in America, was denounced as a "dangerous radical" 
because he called for an eight-hour day when most workers still 
worked, ten, twelve, and more hours, because he advocated social 
legislation, established ties with the organized labor movement 
abroad ·led by Karl Marx, ahd spoke of the interests of the workers 
as class interests. The Left-wing trail continued through the men 
of the eighties who went beyond raising of the slogan for an eight-
hour day and led a general strike movement for it. Some of them, 
like the Haymarket Square victims, were denounced as "Reds" 
and "internationalists," were framed and paid the death penalty. 
Eugene Victor Debs, the railroad man, was another of the great 
Left-wing figures. He organized the first big national union of 
railroad workers on an industrial basis and demonstrated by his 
personal, fighting leadership the superiority of such an organization 
over the old craft form. . 
Then came "Big Bill" Haywood, the miner, who personified the 
freshness, vigor and fighting-spirit of our developing West. He led 
the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) in its most con-
structive days when it marched under the banner of industrial 
unionism and fought some of the most militallt battles in American · 
labor history. The trend of fighting progressivism continued through . 
many others-men like Tom Mooney whom the union-haters en-
tombed for a generation in San Quentin on charges that were 
proven a frame-up. 
The forerunner with the most profound influence upon the rise 
and development of the c.I.O. was the militants' movement in 
the A. F. of L. led by William Z. Foster, today chairma.n of the 
Communist Party. 
The Trade Union Educational League (later the Trade Union 
Unity League) which he founded stormed the stagnant, bureau-
cratic horse-and-buggy spirited A. F. of L. leadership some fifteen 
years prior to the birth of the c.I.O. The movement led by Foster 
rounded out and raised to new heights the progressivism that had 
been shaping up in the ranks of the working class of America: 
The Left-progressive principles associated with Foster's name 
were hammered out and tested in sharp struggles against the poli-
des of union collaboration and collusion with employers, racketeer-
ing, bureaucracy and do.;nothingism that the A. F. of L.'s leaders 
followed in the "prosperity" twenties and crisis thirties, and in 
struggles· against the Gompany-unionism and open-shoppism of 
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that period. The T.U.E.1. was the principal force in labor's ranks 
that kept alive the fire of genuine unionism and working-class 
solidarity at a time when many labor lea~ers followed policies that 
were literally extinguishing the labor movement. The Left-pro- . 
gressives were the principal initiators of s!ruggles against reaction ' 
in those days-notably in coal, maritime, needle trades, textile, 
auto, and agriculture, while the Right-wing leaders had virtually 
abandoned the strike weapon. The latter even tied wages to ,pro-
ductivity and cooperated with employers on speed-up and bonus 
swindles. When confronted with dissatisfaction and revolts among 
their members, the Right-wingers in power often depended on 
. hired gangsters to keep them. in office. 
LEFT PROGRAM TAKES SHAPE 
What are some of the features of the 'Left-progressive program 
that emerged in that pre-c.I.O. struggle against labor bureaucracy 
and "golden rule" open-shop paternalism? We will list only a few 
of the major ones: 
1: Organization of the unorganized, especially in the basic 
mass production industries. The central theory of the A. F. of 1. 
was still guided by the antiquated formula that only skilled work-
ers are organizable and only their demands can be bargained for 
collectively. This policy left the major industries to company 
unions and 90 per cent of the country's workers unorganized. 
2. Industrial unionism, or amalgamation of existing craft unions, 
as the only effective form through which the bulk of the unor-
ganized workers could be unionized. The A. F. of 1. considered 
the craft form as the primary form of union, with each one of them 
interested in only those workers in a plant under its jurisdiction. 
3. Militancy and a strike strategy that involved the mass of the 
affected workers through a rank and file machinery, as the key to 
victory. The A. F. of 1. leaders minimized the strike as a weapon 
and frowned upon militancy. They steered toward strikeless, col-
lusive relations with employers on a claim that such was the path 
to advancement for the workers . 
• 
4. Independent political action by labor and establishment of a 
new people's party to express the class and anti-monopoly interests 
of the working class and its allies. The A. F. of 1. leaders opp<?sed 
the very concept that the working class of America is a class and 
needs its own political party. They held down labor:s political con-
sciousness to a minimum or confined it to a choice within the 
framework of the two old parties of capital. 
5. Trade union democracy and elimination of all forms of 
racketeering, gangsterism and bureaucracy in the unions. This pro-
gram challenged the dictatorial regimes in A. F. of 1. unions and 
the numerous practices of fraud and terror that were used to per-
petuate reactionaries in union office. 
6. Rejection of Red-baiting in all its forms and guarantee of full 
political freedom and rights to all, including Communists. This 
was especially directed against the practice begun by A. F. of 1. 
leaders of inserting clauses in union constitutions batring Commu-
nists from membership or office. This weapon was in reality directed 
against all opponents of reactionary administrations upon whom 
the "Red" label could be tagged. 
7. The struggle for the rights of the Negro people as one of the 
most important tasks constantly confronting all unions. The unions 
themselves must be freed of Jim Crow and any other form of 
hidden or open discrimination and white supremacism. The 
A. F. of 1. of that period virtually ignored the problem of Negro 
rights and to an even greater extent than t·oda y was honeycombed 
with constitutional and . hidden race bars. Hardly a union elected 
a Negro to office. 
8. The shop steward system through which rank and filers on the 
job are the most vital machinery of the union. This slogan was 
frowned upon by the A. F. of L.'s top leaders because imposition of 
tight union control from the top was their formula. 
9. Rank: and file control with contracts subject to democratic dis-
cussion and approval. This was aimed at the sell-out practices that 
were so common in those days with contracts often going into 
effect without so much as the membership approval of the new 
terms. 
10. Internatio~~lism, expressing the common inter; st of Ameri-
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can workers with those of other lands, demands an organiza-
tional tie to a world organization of labor. The A. F. of L. most often 
screened its membership from international problems. 
11. The struggle for peace, with U.S.-Soviet friendship the 
keystone of security from war. The A. F. of L. leadership tradition-
ally left foreign policy to the Wall Streeters. They even continued 
their opposition to recognition of the Soviet Union by the United 
States after the Roosevelt administration opened diplomatic rela-
tions with it. " 
12. Unemployment insurance and adequate old age security. 
These measures were advocated and fought for by the Left forces 
even before the 1929 crisis. But the A. F. of L. opposed jobless 
insurance until its 1933 convention when some 15 million were 
already unemployed. 
Is there anything in the above 12 points that smacks of 
((foreign influence" or «totalitarianism"'? The Left fought . 
for the above program years before anyone even dreamed 
of a C.I.O. These issues were fought over in most union con-
ventions of the twenties and early thirties. In some cases 
resolutions embodying most of die above program will be 
found approved in the bulky conve)ltion records of impor-
tant unions. 
HOW THE C.I.O. DEVELOPED 
The c.I.O. came about as a result of a split, lor the first time, in 
the ""top bureaucracy of the Right-wing camp. A number of leaders, 
headed by Lewis, felt that the entire labor movement was doomed 
to destruction if some real steps toward modernizing it were not 
. aken. They anxiously watched powerful unions in Europe being 
smashed by Hitler and saw how Right-wing leaders like themselves 
were thrown into concentration camps. It was also apparent that the 
A. F. of 1. craft union form brought no progress for labor in face 
of a favorable opportunity offered under the Roosevelt adminis-
tration and the Wagner Act. 
Ie was clear that unless in?ustrial unionism was made the weapon 
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no real organtzmg progress was possible. Industrial unionism and 
organization of unorganized through a policy of supporting the pro-
Roosevelt coalition, was the essence of the C.lO.'s program when 
it was born. It soon became the rallying center of a coalition of 
forces within the labor movement that included the Republican 
Lewis and Democrats Murray and Hillman; Social Democrats like 
David Dubinsky; Left-progressives like Harry Bridges, and Commu-
nists like Ben Gold. 
When the big organizing drives of the C.I.O. got under 
way in steel, rubber, electrical, auto, textile, marine and other 
industries, the C.I.O. found it necessary to rely to a great 
extent on the army of devoted and trained Left-wing fight-
ers, many of them Communists. These forces had been edu-
cated and trained in the small, but active Left-progressive 
movement led by Foster in pre-C.I.O. days. Also, pressed by 
necessity and the influence brought in by the Left, the new-
born C.I.O. accepted much of the program that had been 
hitherto classed as Left. ' It was soon reflected within the 
C.I.O. in the rank and fileism, shop steward machinery, mili-
tancy, vigor, democracy, emphasis on Negro rights, an anti-
monopoly position and rejection of Red-baiting that char-
acterized so much of its early life. 
But the main characteristic of the new-born C.I.O. was its 
unity around a central objective--organization of the un-
organized workers in basic industry and doing i~ on its repu-
tation as a fighter for real advancement of the economic 
standards of the workers. That is what enabled · it to hold 
the different groups together despite political and other dif-
ferences among them. This unity for an objective also gave 
the C.I.O. something to drive after and fight for and carried 
it forward to win millions wIthin a couple of years. 
This unity wasn't entirely smooth. It showed signs of cracking 
even at the initial stage when David Dubinsky of the Ladies Gar-
ment Workers and Max Zaritsky of the Cap and Millinery Work-
ers left the C.lO. They feared the militant progressivism that th~ 
C.I.O.'s drives was arousing throughout the country, even in their 
own unions. Lewis himself took a walk at a later stage after unsuc" 
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Cess fully trying to break away the CI.O. from the pro-Roosevelt 
coalition and its support of an anti-fascist war program. But the 
basic united front, of which a coalition between the forces around 
Philip Murray and the left was the backbone, continued to hold 
together through the war and for a short time after hostilities ended. 
It held together despite constant attempts to disrupt it through 
House Un-American Committee witch-hunts, the A. F. of L:s bu-
reaucracy, Dubinsky's Social-Democratic friends within the CI.O. 
like Walter Reuther and Emil Rieve, and of the Vatican-directed 
Association of Catholic Trade Unionists. 
Thanks to this unity, the C.I.O. stood far in front of all 
labor in its contribution to the war effort against fascism, 
while the same Social-Democratic, A.C.T.U., Red-baiting ele-
ment that today calls the tune in the Rightwing camp, 
obstructed the war effort. 
COALITION FOR C.I.O. PROGRESS CRACKS 
The breakup of the united front through which the CI.O. made 
its historic advance, began when Murray and his associates in the 
"middle" turned their back on the past program and went full hog 
for the Truman Doctrine and the resultant Marshall Plan. His new 
foreign policy was an undertaking to whip the unions into line for 
the Marshall Plan at all costs. The inevitable result was the side-
tracking of the economic and other domestic problems of the work-
ers. Every past policy of the CI.O. began sharply · to contradict the 
new foreign policy. Opposition to Universal Military Training in 
face of the CI.O. leadership's support of a warlike policy against 
the Soviet Union and of arming of a Western Bloc, became mean-
ingless. The Portland convention dropped even the past formal 
opposition to UMT. Similarly the past policy of organizing mass 
campaigns of pressure upon the President and Congress fo~ labor's 
demands was dropped. Already in June> 1947, on the eve of passage 
of the ·Taft-Hartley Law, C.I.O. affiliates that called for a march on 
Washington and other such forms to dramatize labor's sentiment, 
were denounced by Murray. Also, the C.I.O:s official attitude toward 
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the World Federation of Trade Unions changed overnight to one of 
quitting it and working for its destruction. The Soviet trade unions, 
so highly lauded in a pamphlet by a C.I.O. delegation that visited 
the U.S.S.R: and praised by Murray himself, suddenly became "gov-
ernment dominated," and "slave labor" was just as suddenly dis-
covered in the Soviet Union. 
Life in the C.I.O. shifted quickly to factionalism over for-
eign policy. Wage raises, organization of the unorganized, 
and other such objectives were effectively side-traclted. The 
C.I.O.'s network of paid representatives and organizers be-
came mainly occupied in a drive on opponents of the Marshall 
Plan and supporters of the Progressiv~ Party. All C.I.O. state 
and city councils were ordered to either comply with the 
political position taken by the top leaders or face loss of their 
charter. In its worst days the A. F. of L.'s leadership did not 
try to dictate political views to its lower bodies. The C.I.O.'s 
leaders sOon followed the pattern of bureaucracy set by the 
A. F. of L. a generation back. Once more the progressive Left 
was called upon to wage a new struggle against new forms 
to company-unionize and paralyze the labor movement. But 
the struggle is on a far more advanced stage of development 
than it was in the days prior to the C.I.O.'s rise. 
WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES? 
The Portland convention's progressive-sponsored resolutions, re-
ports, and speeches of delegates, indicated some of the differences 
that had been brewing in the C.I.O. Some of 'these differences were 
not fully reflected because of the limited opportunity for elabora-
tion given the Left by the dominant Right wing. But the main 
differences on issues in the c.I.O. were: 
1. Organize the UN -~rganized! 
Organization of the unorganized, the No.1 point on 'the c.I.O.'s 
agenda, was virtually forgotten in the frenzied drive for the Mar-
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shall Plan. As these lines are written, the Southern organizing drive 
is still nil in results and it hasn't moved much for two years. In place 
of the earlier phenomenal gains in membership, the c.1.0. lost 
heavily in a number of fields. Its main historic aim has now been 
perverted into a vulture-like program of raiding and disorganizing 
the organized. Lip service is still given to organizing among the 75 
percent of the workers not in unions. But with most of its energies 
and resources devoted to watchdog service over c.1.0. affiliates on 
behalf of the Marshall Plan, results have been negligible. 
The Left wing demands a return to the original C.I.O. 
program of major emphasis on organizing work and genuine 
mutual assistance among C.I.O.· unions, not raids and Uim_ 
perialist" swallowing up of smaller unions by a few large 
ones. The Left calls for return to the USpirit of '36" when 
ability and devotibn, and not one's political pedigree counted 
in the choice of organizers. . 
2. For Real Labor Unity! 
The age-old principle of solidarity and unity was forgotten by the 
Right wing. Even scabbing on sister unions is condoned, if the 
victimized organization is on the "wrong" side of the political fence. 
The Left aims to revitalize the principle of labor unity both 
within the C.I.O. and within the labor movement as a whole. 
It views the p~actice of using Taft-Hartley anti-Communist 
affidavits against another union as no different from scal>bing. 
It was always A.B.C. for labor that solidarity against em-
ployers knows no political or other differences among the 
workers. The fibre of solidarity has been seriously strained 
in recent years, especially since pre~sure of the Truman 
Doctrine and T aft-Hartleyism became reflected in the labor 
movement. Only a vigorous rank and , file movement could 
return the spirit of unity to labor and force both the C.I.O. 
and the A. F. of L. seriously to talk of uniting, or at least 
acting together on issues affecting labor. The sad fact is that 
after 14 years of division, A. F. of L. and C.I.O. leaders ac-
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quired vested interests and entrenched themselves in their 
separate fields. Only the Left, having no interest in main-
taining the division, could view the problem from. the stand-
point of its basic significance for the whole working "class. 
3. Back, to a Fighting Wage Policy! 
Leadershi p in raising wage standards, shortening the workweek . 
and combating the killing speedup on the assembly lines, was the 
principal reason for the c.I.O.'s popularity during its first decade. 
The sweep in 1936-37 resultea overnight in significant material 
gains. Workers saw and felt the result in their homes and in the 
shops. The militancy and anti-monopoly character in the strikes and 
drives in steel, auto, rubber, electrical and the other big corporation 
fields, left a deep imprint upon the c.I.O. Settlement of grievances 
was most often achieved through direct shop action led by stewards. 
Stoppages often challenged excessive speedup_ Lightning response 
from the workers made dismissal or penalizing of active unionists 
too risky. Red-baiting was stamped as an employer tactic. The at-
mosphere was hardly the kind in which leaders like Murray, Rieve 
and Reuther could flower out with their theories of labor-manage-
ment love. But the turn of the C.I.O.'s leaders to cooperation with 
the trusts on foreign policy and in the political field has, in the 
recent period, also led to their yielding to the bosses on wage policy. 
The wage resolution adopted at the Portland convention is an 
example. This time the c.I.O. did not set its usual annual wage ob-
j~ive. The resolution was an ambiguously-worded statement in 
favor of a "high consumption level economy" with wages "a greater 
share of an ever-increasing national income" and this is possible 
"within the framework of a reasonable profit structure." This, in 
plain language, is tying wages to productivity and "reasonable profit." 
An employer who could "prove" that he didn't make a ':reasonable 
profit" (whatever that is) or that either his productivity or the 
national income isn't rising, is thus armed in advance with an argu-
ment against a needed raise. .• 
This wage policy is an old one. The A. F. of L, embarked upon it 
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in 1925, in the heyday of a capital-labor love idyll. It was based 
on the. theory that the parder the workers work for their boss the 
more he'd be able to afford to pay them in wages. This nonsense was 
effectively shattered with the 1929 crash. But the A. F. of 1. .dusted 
off that resolution in its 1947 convention. The C.LO. dusted off the 
discredited speedup and bonus schemes of the twenties with re-
newed ballyhoo for its so-called "Industry Coun:cil Plan" through 
which employers, labor and government would be "partners" in 
"planning" production. The very idea that our "free enterprising" 
corporations would take labor into . "partnership" is laughable. But 
the "Council Plan" is becoming a pattern for management~union 
collaboration for speedup. 
The C.lO. cannot yet point to a single employer who is even 
inclined to put its "partnership" plan into effect. Its leaders often 
point to the wartime joint production committees in the plants as 
"proof" that their plan is possible. But this is a false comparison. 
The wartime councils, which, incidentally, had their best support 
from the Left wing, were based purely on wartime production needs. 
They proved the contrary: that employers might agree to have a 
joint talk-shop with their employees but won't give them the slight-
est real say on the affairs of an enterprise. 
The "plan" also inspires a wage theory that brings higher profits 
to employers and lower standards to C.lO. members. One example 
is the General Motors-Reuther formula incorporated in the, two-year 
contract signed in May, 1948. With an economic decline and a likely 
drop in the Bureau of Labor Statistics cost-of-living index indicated, 
Reuther obliged the corporation with a double escalator clause that 
calls for a quarterly revision of wages in accord with the drop or 
rise of the index. At this writing, headlines tell of a two-cent hourly 
wage cut General Motors workers will suffer for the first quarter 
of 1949. And that came just at the moment when other divisions ' of 
the auto union, and other unions, too, entered negotiations for a 
"fourth round" wage raise. The union's own research director re-
vealed that auto workers, in terms of purchasing power, were 20 per-
cent behind their rea/, wages of January, 1945. 
On another occasion Reuther endorsed a statement of the N a-
tional Plan'ning Association that conditioned wage increases upon 
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an increase in productivity. In 1946, he gained much publicity for 
his celebrated "look at the books" and "ability to pay" thepry that 
would tie wages to what an employer's books show on profit earn-
ings. Inversely, this theory justifies a wage cut if an employer could 
"prove" he didn't have a profitable year and is not "able" to pay. 
Reuther, it seems, is ready to seize upon any formula but the one 
that says: a worker must get at least what the University of Cali-
fornia's Heller Committee finds neceSJary for a Ilhealth and decencylJ 
stand.wd for a family of four-$78.50 a week in January, 1949. 
Reuther's Social-Democratic friend, Emil Rieve, similarly came 
forward in 1947 with an an~ouncement that in the interest of 
"stabilization" and "anti-inflation'" his union would not ask for a 
wage raise. That announcement proved useful to employers in sev-
eral cities against their striking textile workers. For it Rieve was 
hailed in a Wall Street Journal editorial as a "responsible" labor 
leader. More recently, when the Textron Corp. announced the clos-
ing of its plants in Nashua, N.H., and Esmond, R.I., to move South 
and to Puerto Rico, Rieve revealed that the union agreed to all sorts 
of speedup schemes to induce Textron to stay in New England. But 
despite doubling of production, the company moved anyway. Spread 
the Rieve policy of concessions throughout the industry in the 
North, where his own research director admits textile wages are 
96th on a New England list of 134, and what have you? Still further 
slashing of wages. Some weeks later, the employers and the indus-
try's arbitrator, used the "good business" arguments of Rieve to 
flatly deny a requested lO-cent raise for cotto;t and woolen workers. 
Philip Murray, along the same lines, signed a two-year contract in 
1947 without an assuran'ce of a wage reopener because a change in 
the contract was made entirdy subject to the steel industry's wish 
to do so. 
Left-progressives, just as they did in the twenties, reject 
all class collaboration schemes and formulas on the ground 
that they are both false in theory and paralyze the struggle 
for higher wage standards, shorter hours and a curb on 
speedup. No informed person takes much stock in the talk of 
uplanning" ourselves out of a depression. Depressions are 
the inevitable product of capitalism. The Left-progressive 
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policy of struggle is aJ least a means of reducing the burden 
of the crisis that the employers try to shift on the shoulders 
of the working · class. 
4. For Real Independent Political Action! 
The trend toward independent political action which the c.I.O. 
helped further was reversed after the 1944 P.A.C. campaign to one 
of appending the c.I.O. to the Democratic Party. The formation of 
c.I.O.-P.A.C. (now emulated by the A. F. of 1.) was a step forward 
because it was originally designed to be an expression of independ-
ently cast labor votes, even though limited within the two-party 
system. Instead of going ahead along that path, the c.I.O:s Right 
wing swung their main energy into a struggle against those who 
favored a third party. • 
Murray, as late a December, 1945, delivered a blistering indict-
ment of the Truman administration in a national broadcast from 
Pittsburgh. That was on the occasion when the President first made 
the proposal, opposed by Murray, to hamstring strikes through a 
"fact-finding, cool-off" machinery patterned after the Railway Labor 
Act. Murray said the Truman administration ignored human rights, 
"appeased" industry and gave only "lip service" to social legislation. 
"What is the answer of the federal administration to this dia-
bolical plot of American industry?" asked Murray. "The sole answer 
of the administration is to seek legislation directed against labor . 
. . . To all this arrogance the federal administration yields in abject 
cowardice. Its rancor is confined to labor. 
"I am profoundly disturbed at the implication inherent in the 
President's proposal. It marks a very serious departure from the 
policies which the people of this country have repeatedly approved 
within recent years under the leadership of President Roosevelt." 
The same Murray warmly greeted the President's speech to the 
81st Congress and new . labor bill in which that very proposal was 
again renewed. Murray never explained to the c.I.O. membership 
why he made the amazing political switch. 
Militant progressives, on the other hand, consistently sup-
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port the new· Progressive Party and refuse to be steered f rom 
their path· by glittering promises, or to accept mere words as 
payment upon those promises. Such temporary concessions 
as are wrested from the Truman Administration are in the 
main due to the pressure he, and his friends in the labor move-
ment, feel from the working · class centers. When labor w As 
robbed of the Wagner Act and placld under the Taft-Hartley 
Law, many trade unionists learned how little they could de-
pend on the two old parties. Labor's political ·progress would 
be accelerated only through a political movement completely 
. independent of Wall Street. 
5. For a True Peace Policy! 
• The c.I.O:s foreign policy stand puts it behind the E.R.P. 
although that program ·is quite openly referred to as lend-lease for 
a war upon the Soviet Union. But even the most elementary interna-
tionallabor obligations were forgotten by the Right wing. It took a 
struggle in the resolutions committee at Portland's convention to 
force inclusion of even some mildly-worded oppostion to the execu-
tion of labor leaders in Greece and to recognition of Franco Spain. 
The fact that our occupation forces are putting Nazi cartelists back 
in business and in government hardly disturbs c.I.O. leaders these 
.days. But the most shameful part of this business is the army of 
C.I.O. people in "diplomatic" service in foreign lands, employed as 
"labor attaches" to commissions in charge of the E.R.P. in the respec-
tive countries. They have the task of bteaking down union opposi-
tion to E.RP. and, failing in that, splitting the unions, as they did 
in France and Italy. 
The "cold war" idea also fits into the internal factional needs of 
the C.I.O.'s top bureaucracy. It is used as a weapon against progres-
sives in C.I.O. unions who are conveniently tagged "Russian agents." 
Murray never explained the reason for his about face on foreign 
policy. As late as November, 1946, at the Atlantic City convention, 
the resolution adopted by the c.I.O. said: . 
"Above all the common people of this country demand there be 
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a fulfillment of the basic policy of OUf late President Roosevelt for 
friendship and unity among the three ,great wartime allies-the 
United States, Great Britain and 'the Soviet Union. Failure to accom-
plish this necessarily means dissension an.d strife in the world and 
ultimate war. 
"We reject all proposals for American participation in any bloc or 
alliance which would destroy the unity of the Big Three. If we fail 
to achieve unity then the world faces a war which means destruc-
tion of humanity itself." . 
The resolution further urged that "under no circumstances should 
food or any other aid given by any couritry be used as a means of 
coercing free but needy people in the exercise of their right of self-
government." . 
The Left wing, on the other hand, holds, essentially~ to the 
policy as expressed in the C.I.O. 's past resolutions and rejects 
all forms of warmongering and Soviet-baiting. It holds with 
Roosevelt and Stalin that the friendly co-existence of the S0-
viet Union and America is both possible and imperative for 
a durable pc;ace. The Left's stand against the Marshall Plan 
is not based only on the increasingly apparent fact that it 
does not aid those in Europe who need aid most, but that it 
aims to build a warlike Western Bloc and keep the world on a 
war footing. The fact that the Ruhr has shown most rapid 
recovery and has become the hub of a West European arsenal, 
while people in France and Italy go hWJ.gry, gives evidence 
of the E.R.P. pattern. But no less impo~ant is the adverse 
effect E.R.P. is having upon conditions within America~ U.S. 
international trade has been hit hard by the loss of the mar-
ket in Eastern EurQpe. The great unemployment on our 
waterfronts is a reflection of that. Moreover, the tremendous 
military budget and E.R.P. requirements tax so much of our 
productive capacity that they have become the main prop 
for the high cost of living. Americans have been paying for 
it not only in taxes, but in high prices across the counter 
as well. Labor, in America, says the Left wing, can have 
a tremendous influence in shifting the world to a constructive 
basis and toward disarmament, by pressing for a genuine 
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peace policy and showing the promoters of war that labor 
is not biting on ~heir sucker bait. 
6. Restore Pol'itical Freedom! 
The 'Right wing in control of the c.I.O. has moved to virtually 
nullify the aut~nomy of affiliated unions. The state. and city indus-
trial union councils have already lost all right to independent ex-
pression on policy. They were flatly informed that they must take 
political dictation from general headquarters. This started with the 
drive to jam the Marshall Plan down the throats of every council 
and crack down on any that backed the Progressive Party. But in the 
case of internatiortal affiliates, while Murray and associates are forced 
to formally recognize their autonomy, the enforce~ent club over 
"non-conformers" is raiding. Raiding is reprehensible, runs their 
argument, but unions that "conform" to the c.I.O.'s political deci-
sions won't be raided. Or C.I.O. leaders hide behinq subterfuges. 
At the Portland convention Murray sprung the charge that a 
number of el.o. affiliates aren't growing fast enough in their field 
and he asked authority for the executive board to "investigate" and, 
if need be, "reorganize" those unibns under new leaders. The false-
ness of Murray's argument is clearly evident in the fact that the 
targets are unions in the office and professional, communications, 
public and government, agricultural; and food, and farm equipment 
fields in which these very unions broke ground for unionization. 
Murray was really shielding the real running sore in the el.o.-
the Right-wing unions like shipbuilding, railroad, lumber and others 
that have degenerated and declined frightfully in their membership. 
The textile workers have not embraced more than 25 percent of the 
workers in the industry since the first organizing drive a decade ago. 
And Murray conveniently overlooked the fact that the very unions 
ne attacked were subject to vulture raids of unions led by his qwn 
supporters at the very time when the employers are trying to get rid 
of collective bargaining in those fields. It seems hardly fair to attack 
a union 'for not growing faster when its treasury and staff must be 
given to fighting off vulmre raids of "sister" c.I.O. unions. 
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In moving to kHl autonomous rights-something even the 
A. F. of 1. never dared to try-the c.I.O:s leaders pose a funda-
mental question. Is the C.I.O. to be turned into a political party 
and enforce the kind of discipline you'd expect in a tightly knit 
political party? The basic function of a trade union is to unite its 
members on the solid ground of their common economic interests. 
That kind of unity can be achieved only if all workers, regardless of 
political opinion and affiliation, are insured equal rights and protec-
tion. Surely, the cooperation of separate unions cannot be made a 
reality unless autonomy on political opinion and candidates, on 
foreign policy and like issues, is scrupulously respected. 
The trade unions must, of course, advance the fight on the politi-
cal front in every possible way, says the Left-wing. Every effort must 
be made to find common ground on political objectives. But the 
basic approach-and one which brings results--is discussion, per-
suasion, and voluntary action. Conviction is the key to effective 
action. That was the approach of the C.I.O. in its earlier and more 
successful days. While some of the Left-progressive delegates in 
Portland explained to the convention why they are for the Progres-
sive Party, the Left block did not demand in its political resolution an 
endorsement of the Progressive Party. The resolution only demanded 
the autonomous right of each c.I.a. union to support that party. 
7. Rest()Te Democracy in the C.I.O. 
Democracy is fast being wiped out in mo~t Right-wing controlled 
unions and in the c.I.O. itself. Murray's own union set the tone in 
its 1948 convention with a constitutional clause forbidding the 
. election of Communists, or supporters of "Communist views," even 
to a committee of a local. It was at that very convention that Nick 
Migas, a Communist critic of Murray's no-wage-raise policy, was 
shamelessly mobbed and beaten by Right-wing delegates. Along 
with such witchhunts against Communists and supporters of the 
Progressive Party, leaders of other Right-wing unions, following the 
steel union's example, turned their constitutions into instruments for 
perpetuating burea~cratic c1iqu'e control. Terms for officers were ex-
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tended to as long as four years; conventions are held less frequently; 
the. number of convention delegates has been reduced; salaries of 
top officers were raised to business executive levels; locals and dis-
tricts were stripped of autonomous rights; shop stewards are grad-
ually losing their real functions and grievances are processed, ~f at 
all, through a top level machinery; c.I.O. councils have been turned 
into rubber stamps for top policy; and expulsion of members for 
views has begun to appear in certain C.I.O. unions. 
All this is taking place in a movement that challenged the old 
A. F. of 1. because of its bureaucratic rule. And it was only in May, 
1946, that, on Philip Murray's introduction, the convention of the 
steelworkers unanimoUsly adopted a policy statement which said: 
eeWe ask no man his national origin, his color, his religion 
or his beliefs. It is enough for us that he is a steel worker and 
that he believes in trade unionism ..•• Our union has not 
been and will not be an instrument of repression. It is a 
vehicle for economic and social progress •..• As a democratic 
institution, we engage in no purges, no witch-hunts. We do 
not dictate a man's thoughts or beliefs. Most importan~ of all 
we do not permit ourselves to be stampeded into courses of 
action which create division among our members and sow 
the disunity which is sought by those false prophets and hypo-
critical advisers from without who mean us no good." 
The Left-progressives asked no more than adherence to this policy 
so eloquently stated by Murray himself. 
8. End Red-Baiting~W eapon of Disruption! 
Red-baiting and suppression of political minorities now perme-
ates official c.I.O. policy. Until Murray's foreign policy turn began, 
the c.I.O. was on record against Red-baiting. So strong was the 
C.I.O.'s traditional aversion to Red-baiting that even today lip ser-
vice is still given to a resolution calling for the abolition of the 
House Un-American Committee. But such resolutions are a mockery 
in face of application within the C.I.O. itself of precisely the type 
of witch-hunt practiced by the House body. Nor could c.I.O. official 
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protests against witch-hunt House hearings on unions be taken seri-
ously if a top officer like secretary-treasurer James B. Carey appeared 
as a star witness against officers of his own electrical union . 
• We are in effect witnessing a brazen attempt in the C.I.O. to 
wipe the past from the minds of the membership and especially to 
blot out the fact that Left wingerst including Communists, were the 
most active forces in the initial organizing drives of most of the 
key c.I.O. unions. Mur~ay himself, as director of the Steel Workers 
Organizing Committee, enlisted scores of well-known Communists 
for full-time work in the toughest sectors of the steel front. 
The situation was the same in auto. The men who led the famous 
sit-down strike in 1937 in Flint and cracked General Motors were 
mainly Communists. The pioneers in the Ford organizing drive and 
sparkplugs in that company's main plant, were and continue to be 
the Communists. The Communists were in the very heart of the 
drives that brought the maritime, transport, <;lectrical, furniture, 
office, public, farm equipment, packinghouse, fur and leather, de-
partment store, shoe and other unions into existence. 
As a matter of fact, there is a concerted effort by the c.I.O. 
leaders to begin the history of their organization with the day 
Murray was named president and to black out even the name and 
role of Lewis, its first leader. 
The real object is to black out the period when a united 
front was in effect and forces of widely divergent views, in-
cluding Communists, were able to cooperate. The Left wing 
calls for ' an end of Red-baiting and restoration of the con-
structive atmosphere of the past, in which cooperation of 
all forces in the C.I.O. was possible. 
9. More Vigor For Negro Rights! 
. The struggle for Negro rights, too, is becoming affected by the 
atmosphere of intolerance that stifles the c.I.O. these days. It was 
the C.I.O.'s early drives that smashed open the gates long shut to 
.Negro workers. When the hundreds of thousands of Negro workers 
poured into the steel, auto, packinghouse maritime, and other unions, 
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the A. F. of 1., too, was forced to loosen its bars. As a result, a great 
historic change occurred with the entrance of an estimated million 
Negro workers i~to unions. The c.I.O. also showed some progress 
in the advancement of Negroes to leadership in unions. In seveool 
cases, notably Left unions. Negroes were elected to top offices. In 
the recent period, however, signs have been increasing of c.I.O. 
retreat on the problem of Negro rights. It is also ~pparent that the 
Right-wing bureaucracy's present coddling of a few Negro leaders 
of an Uncle Tom caliber is more of a tactic to cover up their neglect 
to do something real on the problem, than a genuine effort to tackle 
it. Thus, for example, when Delegate Nichols, a Negro of the Cooks 
and Stewards, rose in the Portland convention to speak on the legis-
lative report, he demanded that President Truman issue an execu-
tive order to stop segregation in the armed forces. Nichols then 
added that the c.I.O. should also look into its own house and wipe 
out restrictions ag~inst Negroes that still exist. Murray immediately 
called on one of his supporters, President Willard Townsend of the 
Transport Service Workers, Red-baiter, to reply to Nichols. 
"This matter of discrimination in unions of the c.I.O., I think, is 
being given too much overemphasis," said Townsend and he un-
leashed a barrage of insults upon Communists for raising the issue. 
And what did Townsend, himself a Negro, help to cover up? It was 
at the Textile Workers Union convention in Atlantic City, in April, 
1948, that a group of resolutions relating to Negro rights progressed 
to the point where the resolutions committee approved them for 
adoption. They covered condemnation of the Ku Klux Klan and 
"all efforts to divide the American people on the basis of race"; 
endorsement of anti-lynch legislation; opposition to segregation in 
"any form"; calling for passage of a Fair Employment Practice Law 
and elimination of race bias in immigration laws. Those resolutions 
were not brought on the convention floor for action. Instead Presi-
dent Emile Rieve made a statement to newsmen that they were 
"controversial" because there might be some members of the KKK 
in the convention who might object! 
The United Steelworkers on the other hand, has the bulk of the 
Negro workers of the industry in its ranks, and they are easily a 
fifth of the union's membership. But the number of Negro staff 
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people out of the approximately 700 employed by the union could 
be counted on one's two hands. Few Negroes are encouraged to 
higher than local office. In the U.A.W., the progressives, including 
the most active Negro leaders, have been waging a struggle for 
years for election of a Negro to a top post. The main resistance 
came from the Reuther-dominated Right wing which advances the 
"theory" that giving special recognition to problems of Negro 
members is "Jim Crow in reverse." It is under this false theory that 
the Reutherites have consistently refused to face the issue. The 
Left recognizes that it is not enough to give a Negro a membership 
card. He must also get full and equal rights to be upgraded economi-
caPly and elected to leadership within the union. 
10. Restore True Internationalism! 
On internationalism, the leaders of the C.I.O. tumbled quickly 
from a prominent part in founding of the World Federation of 
Trade Unions to a walkout from the W.F.T.U. They now send 
agents to disrupt its affiliates. On this issue the c.I.O.'s Right wingers 
show most clearly how slavishly they respond to the will of the 
Wall Streeters in control of State Department policy. They first 
injected the Marshall Plan issue into the W.F.T.U.'s executive body, 
knowing well that no agreement was possible on this controversial 
issue. Earlier James Carey told pressmen that the C.I.O. is interested 
in using the W.F.T.U: as a channel for reaching European workers 
because if ~the C.I.O. recommends support of the Marshall Plan 
"they [European workers} .won't be able to say it is a Wall Street 
scheme." When some months later, all his maneuvers failed, he 
told newsmeQ. that "Russian domination" made "our role in the 
W.F.T.U. useless." 
Carey obviously meant "useless" to those who found need for 
"labor credentials" to sell the Marshall Plan. This is not working class 
internationalism. This is cooperation with one's own trusts to domi-
nate and exploit peoples of other lands. The position of the c.I.O.'s 
Right wing raises another fundamental question: is the existence 
of the W.F.T.U. to be subject to agreement on all political issues 
raised? That line would obviously doom a labor international with 
representatives of some three score countries. 
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Ironically it was the Soviet trade union leaders who sug-
gested that each W.F.T.U .• affiliate be autonomous in its stand 
on the Marshall Plan and that the issue need not divide the 
W.F.T.U. But a split is what the C.I.O. leaders wanted. At 
the Portland convention the minority resolution called for 
continued affiliation and W.F.T.U. concentration on those 
issues upon which there is common agreement. But common 
agreement is not what the C.LO.'s leaders desire. 
THE CAUSE OF MURRAY'S CHANGEOVER 
How is Philip Murray's changeover of recent times in almost 
every field of c.I.O. policy to be explained? His change of position, 
as we have seen, was most evident since he launched a campaign 
for the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. But there must be 
a more fundamental reason. What caused him to agree with the 
Wall Streeters who supervise the government's foreign policy? 
Murray himself gives a clear answer in his article in the American 
magazine of June, 1948, where he wrote: 
"We have no classes in this country . . That's why the Marxist 
theoty of class struggle has gained so few adherents. We're all 
workers here. . . . Even the division of industrial workers into 
'management' and 'labor' turns out to be somewhat artificial." 
The c.I.O.'s rise and the stormy struggles that took place in the 
wake of its development, were powerful evidence that America is 
indeed a land of class division and class struggle. It was the c.I.O.'s 
advance that smashed the network of labor-management "repre-
sentation plans" in the plants of the trusts and big corporations. 
The c.I.O., more than any other organization in American history, 
advanced the struggle of labor against the monopolies. Such ex-
periences as the South Chicago Massacre during the 1937 "Little 
Steel" strike, the Johnstown "Citizens Committee" episode in that 
struggle, the killings in Youngstown and the fierceness of the 
struggle in every steel town where Murray's own union entered, 
hardly justifies his denial of the class struggle in America. 
Historic reasons explain the false illusions and other factors that 
had for a long time retarded the development of class conscious-
ness of America's working class. They also explain w~y people 
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like Murray, who favor the capitalist system, have been so strongly 
entrenched in our labor movement. But notwithstanding the efforts 
to blind the workers to the realities of the class struggle, class con-
sciousness has advanced substantially in recent years. 
The fact that American capitalism finds it necessary to 
use the Murrays in labor's ranks to help them cChide" the 
class struggle is in itself evidence of the change that is taking 
place in the rank and file of the working class. 
What is the practical consequence of the denial of class division? 
A leader who denies class division must, sooner or later, deny the 
necessity of struggle by labor and must come to the conclusion, 
as Murray does, that the interests of a union can best be served 
'through a policy of servility to employers or, as some choose to 
call it, "labor-management cooperation." It amounts to depending 
on the "good faith" of employers towards their workers. Therein 
is tne source of Murray's pipedream of a beautiful "industry coun-
cil plan" to regulate a "strikeless" and "classless" capitalism. 
There being no division of classes, as Murray says, why should 
the idea be even entertained of a political party or political action, 
independent of the two old monopoly-controlled parties. 
A labor leader who doesn't believe in struggle for progress 
dooms the workers to stagnation, defeat and retreat. Only 
those who always see a fight ahead for new objectives give 
the workers a perspective' that drives forward. For one with 
Murray's narrow outlook the millenium is reached when an 
industry is organiZed and a labor uleader" can get down to 
the steady routine of administering the affairs of the or-
ganization on the basis of cCpart;p.ership" with the other side. 
The problem then becomes one of tightening a grip · over· the 
union, restricting its democracy, limiting the role of its shop stew-
ards, stifling action below on grievances, rev-ising the constitution 
to place more control at the top, lengthening the period between 
conventions and elections and, above all else, outlawing those in the 
union who insist that it must keep going forward-the 'Commu-
nists and all those who could be labeled "Communists." 
The policy that denies the Communists a role in the 
unions stems directly from the nonsense that we have neither 
classes nor a class struggle. The ColJUltunists have a funda-
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mental view that calls for a steady drive forward for the 
working class precisely because they recognize that the class 
struggle is here and cannot be abolished under capitalism. 
Those who indulge in Uno-classes" fancies are consciously 
• or unconsciously working to paralyze the workers and divert 
them from the only course they have under . capitalism to 
gain anything-struggle. The only way the: workers can 
truly be both workers and controllers of industry and have 
no need of struggles like those they engage in, is through 
socialism. That means the working class in political power 
and the in~ustries socialized under a government it heads. 
It is the ultimate perspective of socialism that gives the 
Communists an unending perspective of going forward to-
ward new objectives all the time. This is why they so often 
corne in conflict with those who are stagnant, or tire of going 
ahead. This is also what makes Communists the most ~on­
sistent force within the camp of the progressives. This, too, 
is why their leaders are being hounded and persecuted. 
How explain the willingness of Communists and others of the 
Left to enter into a coalition with Murray and others like him, 
whose fundamental stand in suppOrt of capitalism is well known? 
The Communists enter a coalition with any forces that may offer 
even a temporary and partial advancement for the workers. In do-
ing so, they also strive independently to carry the advance as far as 
possible, usually beyond the objectives of others in the coalition. 
They wouldn't be real Communists if they only held in view their 
ultimate aim of socialism and paid no attention to every possibility 
for an immediate advancement · of the interests of the workers; or 
if they just tailed behind people like Murray. 
That there was harmony in the 1941-46 Murray-Left coalition 
is explained by the fact that in those days even Murray's limited 
perspective had much in common with the Left, notably on or-
ganizing' the steel industry and prosecution of the war effort. The 
wage drive immediately after the war, largely due to the pressure 
of his own members, was another factor. But with the advent of the 
"cold war" policy, and the increase4 reactionary pressures of Wall 
Street, Murray's fundamen~al "no classes" view came into play. He 
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suddenly discovered that Communists were ·'outsiders'· and that they 
"interfere" in the c.I.O.'s affairs. He is not original in this. The 
"interference" cry was raised 25 years ago by the A. F. of L.'s 
bureaucrats when their bankrupt craft unionism was challenged. 
It was when the C.I.O.'s top leaders embraced the "cold war" 
that the activities of the Left turned into "interference" for them. 
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, in his addr~ss before 
the Portland delegates, attempted to gIve labor leaders of America a 
perspective. His speech is being circulated by the Right wingers 
as an historic document. Justice Douglas, tOO, views America as 
a land with classes. But he is worried because in Europe there is a 
rapid movement toward Socialism and class lines are deeply rooted 
even in the West. He sees it a~ the mission of America to "guide 
Western civilization" away from the path of socialism. Justice 
Douglas noted, however, that American diplomacy, under . the di-
rection of business magnates, has not been successful in that mission 
because of a failure to gain the confidence, or even the ear of people. 
This is where the role qf labor leaders (he mentioned Reuther 
as an example) comes in, because they are "peculiarly qualified 
to bridge a gap that has been growing between the United States 
and Europe." 
"Out of this arises the importance of the fact that American 
labor carries good credentials to Western Europe," said Justice 
Douglas. "Doors tightly closed to all others may open at its knock. 
Words from American labor promise to find quick acceptance." 
Douglas' perspective is for American labor leaders to be the front 
men for American business as salesmen of the Marshall Plan and 
propagandists for our "human welfare state" as he pictures out' capi-
talist system in America. He opened to the Right wingers the 
vista of a green pasture of diplomatic appointments 
Some weeks earlier, leaders of both the A. F. of 1. and C.I.O. 
were elated over a chapter in a new book by Eric Johnston, film 
czar and former head of the Chamber of Commerce. In his We're 
AllIn It Johnston called ·for the appointment of labor leaders like 
. David Dubinsky. to diplomatic posts on the ground that they would 
do better than business men in selling "our way of life" to the 
Europeans. Neither Johnston nor Douglas were original. Walter 
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Reuther, speaking before the ClO. convention in Boston, in 1947, 
was critical of the State Department for not using labor leaders 
to put over the Marshall Plan in Europe. 
THE MAIN SOURCE OF C.I.O. STRIFE 
Where does the main source of factional strife stem from in the 
c.I.O.? The Social-Democrats and the Association of Catholic Trade 
Unionists are the two groups that have been pressing for the present 
J?Olicy of the c.I.O. since the days before the war. They have en-
gaged in every conceivable disruptive tactic. Their main line was 
to disrupt the "Left-middle" coalitiop that held the c.I.O. to its early 
and wartime progressive direction. The main tactic was Red-
baiting, use of the House Un-American Committee and the help of 
employers, Chamber of Commerce, N.A.M. and of the newspapers. 
They supply the witnesses and fingermen for the witch-hunters. 
These groups were most helpful to the Taft-Hartleyites because they 
were primarily interested in the anti-Communist affidavit as a 
means of eliminating Left-progressives from union office. 
The heart of the program of Social Democracy is war upon the 
Soviet Union. The Social-Democrats' of America have worked with 
might and main to pressure American labor for support of Wall 
Street's program of .world conquest with Social-Democrats in West-
ern Europe a ready base for it. Everything else is secondary to the 
Social-Democratic union leaders. Hence their readiness to col-
laborate with the trusts for a renamed Taft-Hartley Law (as Du-
binsky has already proposed); on wage policies, like the Reuther-
General Motors "escalator clause" formula or Rieve's wage policy; 
for watering down of pro-labor legislative measures before Con-
gress and on knifing working-class progress toward a new political 
party. Reuther, Rieve, Emil Mazey, secretary-treasurer of the U.A.W., 
George Baldanzi, vice-president of Textile, are among the leaders 
of the c.I.O.'s Social-Democrats. They are noted for a mOJ;e dema-
gogic and polished way to hoodwink the workers, thanks to their 
"socialist" background. 
The A.C.T.U. came into existence in the late thirties at the 
direction of a Vatican policy that allows Catholics to join "neutral" 
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\ not Catholic-controlled) unions only if they have their own asso-
ciations to guide them in those organizations. In its initial stages 
the A.C.T.V.'s Red-baiting line was not too strongly pronounced. 
Hut suppression of the anti-Semitic pro-Nazi movement led by 
Father Charles Coughlin channeled much of · this element into the 
new~born A.C.T.V. This coincided with the unfolding of the V-ati-
can's line for a shift of the anti-fascist war to a war against the 
Soviet Union. 
The very idea of a faction in the trade unions based on religious . 
lines is obnoxious to AmerIcans. One of our most cherished tradi-
dons has been strictly observed in American unions. We had never 
known of religious cleavages in unions since the earliest 9rganiza-
tions 150 years ago. But the A.C.T.V. brought with it the Vatican 
pattern of "Catholic unionism" like the type that has been divid-
ing labor in some European countries, and the economic program 
of clerical fascism like the kind now in effect, with Vatican blessing, 
in Franco Spain and Salazar's Portugal. The A.C.T.V., too, is 
plugging for an "industrial council plan" and points to Gen. De 
Gaulle's plan for a Franco-like corporate state economic machinery 
in place of unions, as the very image of the A.C.T.V.'s program 
for America. Patronage, bonus and production speed-up plans of 
non-union companies, notably Eastman Kodak, are pointed to by 
the A.C.T.V. as fine examples of "enlightened relations." 
The A.C.T.V. is small in membership and has less than a score 
of branches in the country. The majority of Catholic trade unionists 
resent its activities and especially the use of their faith to cover up 
disruptive and company-union-like operations. But the A.C.T.V., 
guided by a number of priests who have been assigned as chaplains 
of its branches, and closely tied to many top leaders in the c.I.O., 
is a powerful influence. 'Murray greeted its 1948 convention al-
though years .back he privately resented A.C.T.V. interference in 
the c.I.O.'s affairs. 
THE LEFT'S PERSPECTIVE 
From the foregoing we have seen that the Left wing of the labor 
movement is not something imported or 'injected into it. It is a trend 
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that has been deeply rooted in the American working class since 
the great struggles of the last century. It has been steadily watered 
and invigorated by the lessons of those struggles. Despite savage 
repression each succeeding progressive upsurge was greater in 
scope and more vigorous in development. In time parts of the 
Left program, although bitterly fought by the old guard, became a 
part of the pattern for most or all of labor. Industrial unionism, 
organization of the basic mass production industries, unemployment 
insurance and the shop steward system are now accepted. 
• We h~ve also seen that some forces go along for a time with the 
progressive trend only to pull back into the conservative camp 
whence they came. Rank and file pressure among their members, 
an upsurge for organization such as blossomed out in the early 
stages of the Roosevelt administration, or a desire to get the help 
of the Left for certain limited advances, may temporarily bring a 
Lewis, Murray, Reuther or a Dubinsky into common cause with 
progressives. Some honest conservatives learn from the good re-
sults and experience in unity with the Left, and they often themselves 
develop into progressives. Others, however, clinging to views that 
hold them to basic agreement with the capitalist class, confine their 
interest to opportunist advantage; to gaining a base for themselves 
in a union, or political power. They look for th~ earliest oppor-
tunity to cut themselves loose from alliances with the Left so as to 
have a free hand in consolidating their machines and entrenching 
their bureaucracies; They then view those who want further prog-
ress as an obstacle, as "interferers" with the "new" policy of play-
ing ball with the corporations. At the bottom of such shift in 
policy by men like Murray is the denial of the class division and 
the class struggle. There being no class division why should a 
union see foreign policy, politics or economics differently than a 
corporation, they declare. 
That does not mean, however, that Left forces demand full ac-
ceptance of their program as a basis for cooperation with other 
groups in the labor movement. On the contrary, the interests of the 
working class as well as progressive influence, are served best where 
the Left enters into united fronts with others on the basis of one or 
a group of issues, for a long or short range period. 
One of the major reasons' for weakness of labor in the past has 
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been the tendency of advanced groups to split away from the main 
stream and set up "pure" and highly disciplined new unions. With 
very few exceptions such ventures turned out a failure. 
In effect, secession or the voluntary isolation of progressives 
to their own corner i~ a form of escape from the far more 
difficult struggle of winning the workers away from the reac-
tionaries and doing so within the labor movement where most 
of the workers belong. One of Foster's greatest contribu-
tions to the labor movement of America was to call a halt to 
such tendencies of left isolation. 
The often-heard charge from Right-wing quarters that c.I.O. 
progressives plan to split away and form a "third labor move-
ment" is not only a falsehood but an attempt to fan secessionism. 
The Rig~t wing would like nothing better than to be rid of pro-
gressives by such voluntary isolation. Precisely because the main 
tactic of the old guard aims to isolate and narrow it, the Left is al-
ways falsely referred to as Communist. The main target of this 
Red-baiting tactic are those in the progressive camp who do not 
go as far as the Communists but who do go along with them on 
certain immediate issues. Unless the Left is alert against Red-baiting 
this splitting tactic of the enemy takes effect. 
The objective of the Left wing in the labor movement 
is far short of the program of the Communists. It does not 
call for abolition of capitalism and its replacement by a so-
cialist order, as do the Communists. The Left wing is gen-
erally uruted on objectives that it strives to achieve within 
the framework of capitalism; it represents the vigorous and 
militant wing of labor and it rejects the concept that labor 
can gain by collaboration with emp~oyers. 
In fact it would be wrong to ascribe the objectives of the Left 
to all those in the c.I.O. who are so often classed as Left wingers. 
The Portland convention demonstrated that a common program is 
only shaping in the Left wing of the c.I.O. Not all in the Left 
camp supported all the minority resolutions in that convention. 
There was evidence of some disunity and lack of clarity in the 
c.1.0:s Left on several important issues. 
In the main, this confusion stems from the fact that the c.I.O:s 
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progressives developed as the best supporters and fighters for what 
was commonly known as "C.lO. policy." 
That was a safe slogan so long as C.I.O. policy expressed 
progress. But the C.I.O.'s progressives neglected to give 
clear expression to their own independent and more funda-
mental view so as to establish: first, · the basic difference 
that divides them from the reactionary Right wing, espe-
cially the Social-Democrats and the Association of Catholic 
Trade Unionists; second, that people like Murray with whom 
they were in a coalition are not basically progressive. 
Such clarity would have enabled the progressives more readily to 
see the change in Murray's line when it began to show itself and 
all the sooner be rid of the illusion that "Cl.O. policy" continued 
to mean what it meant in the first decade of the organization. 
The fact that those in the C.I.O.'s saddle have so shamelessly 
abandoned the c.I.O.'s early spirit does not mean that the mem-
bership or that those in the lower echelons of leadership, have 
dc::>ne so. At Portland, Murray found it necessary to give lip service 
to the "spirit of '36," because he knows most people in the c.I.a. 
long for it. But his promises to return to that spirit mean nothing 
because he is waging war against the very forces that were the 
soul of the drives that made the c.I.a. 
The resurgence of a fighting, advancing C.lO. would undoubtedly 
go a long way toward reversing the reactionary trend in the country. 
The c.I.a. could once more be the pace-setter . for labor and it 
would not be the reactionary A. F. of L. leaders who would be 
calling the tune, as they are doing now. But such needea revival 
will nor come with the approval of the Murrays and Reuthers. 
It can only come as a result of a new coalition, including the Left 
progressives and based on a; new stage of struggles. 
What is the basis upon which such a new coalition can arise? 
Does it have to be a Left coalition? No, it doesn't have to be hased 
on a Left program. But it does require reaffirmation of the prin-
ciples tested in the founding days of the c.I.a. 
Given the will to concentrate on an improvement of the living 
standards of the workers and to unite all on that objective irrespec-
tive of political opinion, it would not be hard to also agree on the 
following program: 
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1. Restoration of political autonomy for C.I.O. affiliates, 
political freedom in each union, and lifting of tbp censor-
ship over C.I.O. state ind city councils. Agreement ol.l po-
litical issues, including foreign policy must be once again 
put on the basis of voluntary agreement and non-coercive 
persuasion without restriction of the rights of any minority. 
2. Restoration of autonomy in all respects so that a 'c.I.O. 
charter would mean . protection from interference or coercion 
from the top C.I.O., as well as from raids and disruption of 
sister C.I.O. unions. 
3. Turning of the principal attention, energy and resources 
of the C.I.O. and its unions, to the original major task of 
organizing the unorganized. That, of course, would also 
mean return to the original practice of mobilizing the best 
of the C.I.O.'s organizing forces, with ability and devotion 
the yardstick, not political opinions. 
4. Abandonment of the paralyzing theories of manage-
ment-labor cooperation to speed up production, in face of the 
urgent need of waging a struggle to curb menacing speed-up 
in industry and combat spreading unemployment. 
5. Shift of wage policy back to one of advancing the real 
w~ges of the workers, not m~rely trailing the cost of living, 
as now. This de~ands abandonment of such formulas as 
would tie wages to productivity, cost of living, profits or 
a company's bookkeeping. That would clear the decks for 
militant united action by C.I.O. unions on · wages. 
6. Elimination of Taft-Hartleyism from the C.I.O.'s blood-
stream. This calls for m~re than u"nity of all C.I.O. unions 
for elimination of Taft-Hartley legislation, or its reenact-
, ment under a new name. Above all, it demands an end of 
scab practices like raiding, bre~king strikes and using anti-
labor laws against other unions that Taft-Hartleyism 
brought into labor's ranks. The elementary untion principle 
of (tAll for one and one for all" must again be restored. 
7. The end of Red-baiting .and restoration of democracy 
in the C.I.O. The practice of discriminating aga~st persons 
for Communist, Progressive Party, or other political affilia-
tion, must end. 
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8. Continuance of the progress toward .internationalism 
. begun by, the C.I.O. when it took a prominent part in the 
formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Issues 
like . the Marshall Plan must not be a cause for a split, but 
should be left to each W.F.T.U. affiliate. 
9. More energetic efforts to advance the struggle for Negro 
rights. This means not only support of civil rights legisla-
iton but also real effort within the C.I.O. and its affiliates to 
encourage adval!«;~ment of Negroes for high union office and 
economic upgrading in all spheres. 
1 O. A real offensive to bring all of American labor into 
one federation, and recognition of the well-established fact 
that reliance upon the top leaders of the A. F. of L. and 
C.I.O. will not bring about such unity. it will take an exten-
sive educational campaign to arouse pressure for it. 
Is there anything "revolutionary" in the above 10 points? They do 
not even embody the full Left-wing program. But they do provide 
the basis for the free, vigorous and_united unionism in the c.I.a. 
A new surge of militancy and progressivism on a higher level 
than ever before, will inevitably sweep through both the A. F. of 
L. and c.I.a. Top reactionary control, no matter how tight, and 
despite the protective cordon of a thousand constitutional clauses 
and repressive edicts against progressives, will not stop that surge. 
Dictatorial rule in the A. F. of L. couldn't stop the progressivism 
of the thirties from breaking out. Already there are indications of 
the coming trend in rank and file pressure for wage increases and 
against speedup that is showing itself in some of the Right wing-led 
unions. 
The sweep of layoffs as this is written and the unmistaken evi-
dence that we are heading toward another depression still further 
showing up the bankruptcy of the Right wingers. They do nOt 
have a program to meet the situation, and cannot have one, as long 
as they are bound hand and foot to a policy of war preparation: 
But in the same measure that disillusion with the Right wing takes 
effect, so developments throw a challenge to the progressive forces in 
the labor movement. It is upon their unity and initiative that the 
next stage forward for labor will depend. 
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